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Inquisitions by Officials:
A Study of Due Process Requirements
in Administrative Investigations-I
The federal inquisitional trend, discussed in the first
installment of this Article, has steadily increased to
a point where subsidence seems improbable. Yet in some
respects, the state inquisitional trend is even more com-
pelling than its federal counterpart. In this installment
of his Article, Mr. Rogge examines the inquisitional
powers of selected state investigators and investigative
bodies, concentrating on those that are common to
several states. He points out that in many states admin-
istrative investigations have replaced the grand jury.
Moreover, states rarely provide for a right to counsel
in such investigations. Mr. Rogge concludes that the
increasing use of state and federal inquisitions threatens
to sterilize the individual civil liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution.
0. John Rogge*
VI. STATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES
In comparison with the federal agencies that exercise investi-
gative subpoena powers, discussed in the first installment of
this Article, the number of state agencies with similar powers
is multitudinous. California, for example, grants investigative
subpoena powers to the head of each governmental department,'
as well as numerous other subordinate officials.2 Mlichigan, on
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. CAi.Gov'T CODE §§ 11180, 11181.
2. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §§ 18627, 18628, 19433-36; CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 155; CAL. ELc.aors CODE §§ 18409, 18465; CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 5200,
5258; CAT. Gov'T CODE §§ 13907-11, 23442, 25170-76, 36801, 37104-07; CAL.
HEALTH & SA -z'r CODE §§ 13111.2, 34317, 34318; C.. LAB. CODE §§ 74, 92,
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the other hand, has fewer agencies with investigative subpoena
powers but more actual investigations, due to its widespread
implementation of judicial inquisitions.3 New York is probably
second to the California and Michigan leadership in these two
areas, but it has had the greatest variety of governmentally
sanctioned investigations. The remaining 47 states also have
numerous provisions for inquisitions by officials, all of which
raise compelling constitutional issues. A consideration of the
most common state agencies and the provisions that empower
them to subpoena witnesses for investigations is therefore essen-
tial to an accurate measurement of the force of the current trend
toward inquisitional proceedings.
The case of In re Groban4 provides a natural starting point
for a study of the investigative subpoena powers of state officials
and bodies. In that case an assistant fire marshal, suspecting the
appellants of arson, subpoenaed them to appear before him with
their business records. They appeared and stated that they
would testify only if their counsel could be present during the
interrogation. When the investigating official replied that their
attorney would not be admitted to the private interrogation,
they refused to testify. The official then held them in contempt
and ordered them imprisoned until they were willing to testify
before him in secret. These commitment proceedings were also
secret, so that the appellants had the benefit of counsel neither
when they refused to testify nor when they were held in contempt
and ordered imprisoned.
This example of state investigative action bears a striking
resemblance to the inquisitional system, in use on the mainland
of Europe. Yet all courts sustained it, the United States Supreme
Court by a vote of five to four. Mr. Justice Reed, writing for
the majority, was of the opinion that witnesses in administrative
investigations, like those appearing in proceedings before a
grand jury, were not constitutionally entitled to counsel.,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion in which
93, 130, 132, 134, 151, 1176, 1419(g), 1484, 1485, 6313, 6314; CAL. UNEMI. INS.
CODE §§ 1953, 1955. California also grants adjudicatory subpoena powers to 98
agencies. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11501, 11510.
3. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943 (1954).
4. 852 U.S. 830 (1957), affirming 165 Ohio St. 26, 128 NE.2d 106 (1955),
affirming 99 Ohio App. 512, 135 N.E.2d 477 (1954).
5. In support of this position, he cited Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th
Cir. 1944). He also cited with approval United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp.
651 (D. Mass. 1955), in which the court made a passing comment that tile
defendant was not "entitled to counsel at the grand jury stage of the proceed-
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Mr. Justice flarlan joined, commented that "the constitution-
ality-of a particular statute . . . cannot be determined by deriv-
ing a troupe of hobgoblins from the assumption that such a
particularized exercise of power would justify an unlimited,
abusive exercise of power. ' Perhaps a consideration of the cur-
rent inquisitional trend, plus the multitude of state agencies with
investigative subpoena powers, would have given him more
pause than did his rosy view of a single piece of Ohio legislation.
His next paragraph concluded with the observation that "the
fullest recognition of the great role of lawyers in the evolution
of a free society cannot lead one to erect as a constitutional
principle that no administrative inquiry can be had in camera
unless a lawyer be allowed to attend. 7 The almost involuntary
response is, why not?
M~r. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Douglas and Brennan, was never more incisive in dis-
sent. He emphasized that "under the reasoning of the majority
every state and federal law-enforcement officer . .. could con-
stitutionally -be given, power to conduct such secret compulsory
examinations. This would . . . go a long way toward placing
'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.' ,,
The procedure upheld in In re CGroban is available in most of
the 50 states. Yet, neither in England, where our accusatorial
method had its early development, nor in France, where the
inquisitional technique took hold, is it possible today for an
official to question a subpoenaed person in secret and without
counsel.9 This poignant illustration of the present force of the
inquisitional trend emphasizes the near reality of what Mr. Jus-
ice Black, quoting James Otis, warned against.
1. Fire Marshal
The Ohio legislation contested in Groban empowers a fire
marshal and his assistants to subpoena any person to appear
hgs,... much less during the preliminary investigatory stages." Id. at 053.
In'Smith v. General Truck Drivers Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal.
1960), involving an action by a union member against his local for issuing him
a withdrawal card without a hearing, the court said, citing Groban: "And the
Supreme Court has recognized that a witness before an administrative body
is mot entitled to representation by counsel" Id. at 20.
6. 352 U.S. at 335-36.
7. Id. at 336.
8; Id. at 337-88.
9. Id. at 351-52 n.32.
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before one or more of them to testify under oath.'0 The investi-
gative hearing may be private, and the official in charge can ex-
clude any person he wishes from the examination, including
counsel for the subpoenaed witness. If the subpoenaed person
refuses to testify or disobeys any of the official's orders, he may
be summarily punished for contempt "by a fine of not more
than one hundred dollars or commitment to the county jail until
such person is willing to comply with the order of such officer.""1
Any statement that the suspect makes during these secret ses-
sions must be turned over to the prosecuting attorney for use in
any subsequent prosecution.
In many states, as in Ohio, the mere disobedience of a sub-
poena can be either a contempt or an offense. In Minnesota, for
example, failure to comply with a subpoena may result in a fine
of not more than 100 dollars or imprisonment until the sub-
poenaed person agrees to comply. 2 A similar fine may be imposed
for a like offense in Iowa, but the jail sentence is limited to 30
days.' Louisiana is more stringent; there a recalcitrant sub-
poenaed witness may be fined 1,000 dollars and imprisoned for
one year, or both.14 Three states, Arkansas, Michigan and Penn-
10. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3737.08-.13, .99(A) (Page 1954). Over
three-fourths of the 50 states give similar powers to a fire marshal or one
of his subordinates, or to comparable officials. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§
45-49 (1958); AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-150, -160 (1056); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 82-818 (1960); CONN. GFN. STAT. REV. §§ 29-57, -58 (1958); Dim.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 6607(f), (g) (Supp. 1962); F1". STAT. § 633.08 (1901);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-729, -730 (1958); HAwAII REV. LAws §§ 184-1, -5
(1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127-/2, §§ 7, 8 (1961); IN. ANN. STAT. § 20-808
(1950); IOWA CODE §§ 100.6-.9 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-202, -203
(1949); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 227.280, .290 (1960); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1508,
:1569, :1571, :1572 (1950), 40:1621 (Supp. 1962); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 97, § 27 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 87, 98 (1957); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 148, § 3 (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.559(7) (1961); MINN. STAT.
§§ 73.04-.06 (1961); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5700, 5701 (1956); MONT. 1REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 82-1214 to 89-1216 (1956); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-509, -510
(1950); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 158:18--20 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 69-
to 69-3.1 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 18-01-10, -11 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 74, § 316 (Supp. 1962); ORE. REv. STAT. § 476.250 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 1184, 1185 (1949), tit. 53, § 37106 (1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 23-28-5 (1956); S.C. CODE § 47-1176 (1962); S.D. CODE § 31.0304 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-2428 to 53-2434 (1955); TEx. INS. CODE art. 5.43
(1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 2864-69 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31,
-32 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.48.070 (1952); W. VA. CODE §§ 2797-800
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 200.21 (1957).
11. OHIO REV. CODE § 3737.99(A) (Page 1954).
12. MINN. STAT. § 73.05(3) (1961).
18. IOWA CODE § 100.8 (1962).
14. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1569, :1621 (1950).
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sylvania, add a compulsory testimony (immunity) provision, 5
but only one state, Georgia, makes any specific provision for
counsel.'8
Moreover, the courts in various of these states have sustained
the admissibility of evidence gathered under these broad inquisi-
tional powers. In State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele,'7 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court refused to require a county attorney to give
the defendant a copy of his testimony before the state fire mar-
shal, although the court did characterize the proceedings before
the fire marshal as "to put it mildly, unusual, drastic, and inqui-
sitorial.' 8 In a later case, State v. Rixon,9 the same court, how-
ever, quashed a grand :jury indictment based on transcripts of
such testimony on the ground that the defendants had been
compelled to testify against themselves in violation of the state's
constitutional guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.F° A confession by an arrested individual to an assistant fire
marshal was held admissible by the Indiana Supreme Court in
a prosecution for arsonY' The Kansas Supreme Court has held
that the testimony of subpoenaed or detained witnesses in the
state's inquisitional proceedings into the causes of fires was
admissible against them in subsequent arson prosecutions, absent
claims of the privilege against self-incrimination 2
In contrast to the many states that provide for the admin-
istrative investigation of fires of suspicious origin, usually in
secret inquisitional proceedings, Nevada provides for a jury of
"three good and lawful citizens, who shall be householders in
the county.:3 Pennsylvania, in contrast to its more recent pro-
visions for inquiries by officials, still has retained an earlier pro-
vision for a jury of not less than three "selected from the vicinity
15. ARK. STAT. ANw. § 82-818 (1960); MICH. STAT. A.,. § 4.559(7) (1961);
PA. STAT. Aiuw. tit. 35, § 1184 (1949).
16. GA. CoDE ANN. § 92A-729 (1958).
17. 117 Aimn. 884, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912).
18. Id. at 385, 135 N.W. at 1129.
19. 180 Miinn. 573, 231 N.W. 217 (1930). But see State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis.
24, 139 N.W. 514 (1913).
20. AMin. CoxsT. art. 1, § 7.
21. Ogle v. State, 193 Ind. 187, 127 NE. 547 (1928).
22. State v. McCarbrey, 152 Kan. 18, 102 P.2d 977 (1940); State v.
Harris, 103 Kan. 347, 175 Pac. 153 (1918). See also Rhinehart v. State, 121
Tenn. 420, 117 S.W. 514 (1908), in which the court sustained a $250 penalty
on a subpoenaed witness for failing to appear before the Tennessee Insurance
Commissioner.
23. NEv. RPv. STAT. § 475.130 (1962).
1964]
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where the fire occurred. ' 24 But similar New York jury provisions
were repealed as "anachronistic" 25 in 1962.20
2. Judicial Inquirer
Several states have enacted provisions for what may be called
judicial inquisitions. These proceedings are conducted by a judge
or similar official, who, upon his receipt of a complaint alleging
the violation of any state law 27 or a particular state law,25 will
subpoena witnesses to appear before him and testify on matters
relevant to the inquiry. 9 If the inquiry reveals that an offense
against the laws of the state has been committed, the judge may
have the suspected offender apprehended to stand trial at a later
date.80
Judicial inquisitions are usually conducted in private, pur-
suant to either express statutory languages' or the suggestion of
the highest court of the state. An example of the influential
effect of a state court decision on the method of conducting sub-
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1152 (1949).
25. N.Y. CODE CnMv. Pnoc. §§ 952-h to 952-a.
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 159.
27. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-301 (1949); Mxcu. STAT.
ANN. § 28.943 (1954); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5131 (1958). Michigan judicial
inquirers may act upon the complaint of any person, while their Kansas
counterparts must act at the request of a county attorney, attorney general
or assistant attorney general. The Wisconsin statute is an interesting com-
bination of the Kansas and Michigan provisions. It permits a magistrate to
examine witnesses provided by any person who files a complaint, but it
requires a magistrate to subpoena witnesses at the request of the district
attorney. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.025 (1958). The South Dakota provision is
similar to Wisconsin's, except that it allows a magistrate to act only upon
the verified complaint of the attorney general or a state or city attorney.
S.D. CODE § 34.0901 (Supp. 1960).
28. The Kansas legislature, in addition to its broad grant of judicial
inquisitional power, has enacted three provisions that permit investigations
into alleged violations of specific laws. KAN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 50-110
(monopolies and unfair trade), § 50-153 (trusts, monopolies, unlawful dis-
crimination, etc.) (1949), § 50-508 (dairy products) (Supp. 1901). Compare
N.Y. Jumcity LAw § 90(10).
29. Failure to comply with a subpoena usually constitutes contempt, for
which a fine or jail sentence may be imposed. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-47
(1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-301 (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945
(1954).
SO. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.944 (1954); S.D. CODE § 34.0901 (Supp. 1960);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.025 (1958).
S1. In Michigan, a sentence of one year in prison, or a fine of from $100
to $1000, or both may be imposed on a judge, prosecuting attorney, or any-
one else admitted to the inquiry who discloses any information about the
inquiry. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.944 (1954). In Vermont, the stenographer is
1964] INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS
sequent judicial inquisitions is found in People ex Tel. Karlin 'v.
Culkin.32 That case involved an investigation into alleged un-
ethical practices of members of the New York bar. When peti-
tioner contested the propriety of such investigations, emphasizing
their damaging effect on the reputation of anyone called as a
witness, Mr. Chief Justice Cardozo replied that "the remedy is
to make the inquisition a secret one in its preliminary stages."'a
As a result of this dictum, judicial inquisitions in New York have
traditionally been conducted in private,34 although the statute
does not expressly require this type of procedure2 5
The rights of a witness subpoenaed to attend a judicial inves-
tigation are severely restricted, in comparison with those of a
witness in a public trial. Only one state statute refers to the right
to counsel,38 and the highest court of that state has interpreted
this provision to apply before or after the witness has been sub-
poenaed, or before he is called, but not during the actual investi-
gation 7 The remaining state provisions for judicial investiga-
sworn to secrecy and may reveal the contents of the record only on the order
of the state supreme court, or a county court. VT. STAT. A'NN. tit. 13, § 5134
(1958). Wisconsin permits a magistrate to hold an investigation in private
and denies everyone but the district attorney the right to inspect the record.
WIs. STIT. ASN. § 954.025 (1958).
32. 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
83. Id. at 478; 162 N.. at 492.
34. This procedure was upheld by the Supreme Court in Anonymous v.
Baker, 860 U.S. 287 (1959). In that case, the Court emphasized the neces-
sity of retaining the "traditional powers of the courts over the admission,
discipline, and removal 6f members of the bar.. . ." Id. at 290-91. It then
referred to the failure of the New York legislature to pass an act that would
have granted the right to -counsel in all investigations, id. at 293 n,7, and
concluded that in this case the witness.had no right to counsel.
85. The statute provides for an "inquiry, investigation or proceeding
relating to the conduct or, discipline of an attorney or attorneys," but does
not state that the inquiry must, .or even may, be conducted secretly. N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAw § 90(10). In fact, the statute is phrased in terms of procuring
documnts for investigations, and the power to direct investigations appar-
ently is implied fr6n the tenor of the statute.
In a later case, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), affirming 7 N.Y.2d
488, 166 N.E.d 672,.199 N.Y.S.2d 658"(1960), the Court held, once again in a
five to four decision, that a member of the bar who claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination in a secret inquisitional proceeding could be constitutionally
disbarred, without more..
86. MICH. STAT. A-iN. § 28.943 (1954).
-37. In re White, 840 Mich. 140, 65 N.W.2d 296 (1954) (dictum), revd on
other grounds, 849 U.S. 133 .(1955); accord, People v. Dungey, 356 MIch. 680,
97 N.W.2d 778 (1959). The Michigan Supreme Court continually refers to
judicial inquirers as "one man grand juries." See, e.g., People v. Hancock, 326
Mich. 471, 40 N.W.d 689 (1950); In re Slattery, 310 Mfich. 458, 17 N.W.2d
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tions do not refer to the right of representation, and state courts
have been unwilling to expand the statutory language in this area.
The justification for this attitude seems to lie in the theory
that administrative investigations generally are fact-finding, non-
adjudicatory proceedings, in which the guilt or innocence of a
witness is not in question;"8 individual rights are not affected,
and hence need not be protected. To further justify this approach,
some states have enacted immunity provisions that protect wit-
nesses from prosecution in some circumstances. Michigan, for
example, permits a witness to refuse to give incriminating an-
swers and, if he is compelled to answer, grants him immunity
from prosecution for any crime about which he was compelled
to give incriminating testimony;" and refusal to answer an
incriminating question will not constitute contempt in Michigan.
Kansas denies a witness the right to refuse to give incriminating
answers, but, like Michigan, protects the witness from a sub-
sequent prosecution for a crime about which he was compelled
to testify.40
These immunity provisions might seem to overcome any
harm resulting from the denial of counsel. This assumes, how-
ever, that an unrepresented witness, unaware of his statutory
rights, will refuse to give an incriminating answer; an assumption
that becomes patently invalid on the realization that an unrep-
resented witness might not know that his answer will incrim-
inate him. Since the statutes are phrased in terms of compelled
testimony, it would seem that an incriminating answer volun-
tarily given would not invoke the immunity provision. Moreover,
251, cert. denied, 825 U.S. 876 (1945); People v. Doe, 226 Mich. 5, 196 N.W.
757 (1924). The statute provides that "any person called before the grand
jury" is entitled, at all times, to legal counsel, unless the proceedings would be
delayed. MICH. STAT. ANNo. § 28.943 (1954). If a judicial inquirer is thought
of as a type of grand jury, it would seem that a witness in a judicial inquisition
is entitled to counsel at all times, rather than at the stages dictated by In re
White, supra. The "one man grand jury" characterization is, of course, a com-
plete misnomer, a fact that the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized. In re
Slattery, supra. Perhaps this phrase is meant to be no more than a convenient
reference point, but its connotations, in light of the statutory language, are
much broader. Professor Robert G. Scigliano has pointed out that the Michi-
gan judicial inquirer resembles the French Juge d' Instruction. ScIGLTANo, Tus
MICHIGAN ONE-M" GRAND Juiny 14 (1957). But see, Myms, Tnz AMEICAN
LE aA SYSTEM 130 n.42 (1955).
S8. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Anonymous v. Baker,
360 U.S. 287 (1959); CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
39. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.946 (1954).
40. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-156 (1949).
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state immunity provisions are ineffective against federal prosecu-
tion,41 a fact that seriously undermines the very purpose of the
provisions.
The United States Supreme Court has placed but one definite
restriction upon the conduct of judicial inquisitions. In In 7e
Oliver it held that although an inquisition could be held in
secret, a sentence of imprisonment for contempt of the inquisi-
41. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 857 U.S. 371 (1958), affirring 2 N.Y.2d 913, 975,
141 NX.2d 825, 142 NYE.d 649, 161 N.Y.S-2d 437, 162 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1957),
afflrming 2 App. Div. 2d 579, 157 N.Y.S-2d 158 (1956). The New York Appel-
late Division concluded its opinion with the statement that there was no "real
and substantial danger that the testimony compelled by the State will be used in
a subsequent Federal prosecution." 2 App. Div. 2d at 586, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
But the Supreme Court in affirming said: "This . . .[compelling testimony]
cannot be denied on the claim that such state law of immunity may expose the
potential witness to prosecution under federal law." 857 U.S. at 379. Thereafter
the Appellate Division in two cases, one involving Frank Costello, and the
other, seven individuals whom the authorities wanted to question about an
alleged gangland meeting at the Appalachin, New York home of the late
Joseph Barbara, Sr., held that a state immunity statute did not have to pro-
tect against the danger of federal prosecution, and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed. People v. Costello, 6 App. Div. 2d 385, 178 N.Y.S.2d 432
(1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 761, 986, 159 N.E.2d 205, 161 N.Bed 741, 186 N.YS.2d
660, 191 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1959); Commission of Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 7
App. Div. 2d 48, 180 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1958), affd, 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.Ed
250, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550, cert. demied sub noa. Mancuso v. Commission of In-
vestigation, 361 U.S. 10 (1959); Miranda v. Commission of Investigation, 360
U.S. 930 (1959). For a criticism of Knapp v. Schweitzer, supra, see ROGE,
THE FPST D THE FiTH 258-61 (1960).
In the leading case of People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284
(1947), which arose out of the investigation into legislative bribery, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court stated: 'It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one
is not subjected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a
State judicial proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against him
in a Federal criminal prosecution." Id. at 651, 29 N.W.2d at 287. Mr. Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230, 238
(1959), in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black concurred,
quoted this language with approval. So too did the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in ruling similarly in Commonwealth v. Rhine, S03 S.W.-d 301 (Ky. 1957). This
court reasoned:
We believe that to render effective the quoted Constitutional provi-
sion against self-incrimination, it is essential that it apply to prosecutions
by the United States as well as to those by the Commonwealth. To hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fact that our citizens are in a very
real sense, as well as in a technical one, citizens of both the State of
Kentucky and of the United States. The jurisdiction of both govern-
ments is coextensive.
Id. at 304; accord, Putnik Travel & Tourist Agency v. Goldbert, 17 Pa.
D. & Cad 590 (1958).
42. 333 U.S. 257 (1948), reversing 318 Mich. 7, 27 N.W.2d 323 (1947).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:557
tion could not be imposed under the same circumstances. In so
holding, the Court reasoned that the imprisonment for contempt
would have violated the defendant's fourteenth amendment
rights, which "include, as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented
by counsel."48 Although this holding might be comforting to
those who contemplate contumacy, it can hardly be said to have
the same effect on one faced with the prospect of being unrep-
resented in a secret inquisition that may provide the basis for
his subsequent criminal prosecution.
3. Attorney General
Many of the states grant investigative subpoena powers in
varying degrees to their attorneys general.4 4 The inquisitional ac-
tivities of New Hampshire's Louis C. Wyman have been most
controversial, and stirringly illustrate the scope of the inquisi-
tional subpoena power. The 1958 New Hampshire legislature,
by a joint resolution, designated this official as its agent for
the investigation of subversive activities, and to this end gave
him, and any authorized member of his staff, inquisitional sub-
poena powers.4 5 In Nelson v. Wyman, 6 the first New Hampshire
case decided under the 1958 resolution, the court stated that
43. Id. at 273.
44. The statutes are collected in FEIN & STACKABLE, TnE SUBPOENA PowER
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 17-27 (1959).
45. N.H. Laws 1958, ch. 307. This was extended for two years in 1955.
N.H. Laws 1955, ch. 197. In 1957 this provision was extended indefinitely.
N.H. Laws 1957, ch. 178, § 178.2, now N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 588: 8-a (Supp.
1963).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 38,
105 A.2d 756 (1954), and the United States Supreme Court in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), treated this official as part of the legislature.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court said:
Having determined that an investigation should be conducted concern-
ing a proper subject of action by it, the Legislature's choice of the
Attorney General as its investigating committee, instead of a committee
of its own members or a special board or commission, was not in and of
itself determinative of the nature of the investigation. His position as
the chief law enforcement officer of the State did not transform the
inquiry which was otherwise legislative into executive action. When
the Legislature chooses to delegate its power of inquiry for the purpose
of ascertaining facts upon which it may decide to take action, we see
no distinction in principle between the delegation of that authority to
the Attorney General and its delegation to a committee or board.
99 N.H. at 38, 105 A.2d at 762-63. The Supreme Court, relying on this lan-
guage and quoting it in part, 354 U.S. at 237 n.4, termed the attorney general
of New Hampshire "a one-man legislative committee." 354 U.S. at 237. But it
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"the examination of witnesses is properly to be conducted in
executive session, unless the witness requests otherwise." ' 7
Attorney General Wyman was an assiduous inquisitor. He
issued a considerable number of subpoenas and held hearings
in various parts of the state. Those whom he subpoenaed in-
cluded Paul Sweezy, a socialist who lectured at the University
of New Hampshire, Willard Uphaus, executive director of the
New Hampshire World Fellowship Forum, and Hugo DeGregory,
whom Wyman thought to be a Communist. According to
Sweezy, "most of those subpoenaed have fallen into one or both
of two groups: first, professors at Dartmouth and the University
of New Hampshire who have gained a reputation for liberal or
otherwise unorthodox views, and, second, people who have been
active in the Progressive Party."4 8 Uphaus refused to give names
requested by Attorney General Wyman, basing his refusal on
the ground that his conscience and religious convictions would
not let him become an informer. Both DeGregory and Sweezy
declined to answer when asked: "Are you presently a member
of the Communist Party?" All three were found in contempt
and took their convictions to the United States Supreme Court,
Uphaus three times. Sweezy won, but Uphaus, ultimately, and
DeGregory lost.49 The first time Uphans was before the Supreme
Court, it vacated the judgment against him and remanded the
case for consideration in the light of its decision in Sweezy. The
New Hampshire court again affirmed. This time the Supreme
Court, by a vote of five to four, let the judgment stand. While
Uphaus was in jail he brought his case before the Supreme Court
a third time, but his appeal was dismissed. Mr. Justice Black, in
a dissenting opinion in which MHr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, observed:
My guess is that history will look with no more favor upon the im-
is submitted that only the people of New Hampshire could make its attorney
general a part of its legislature. In any event, since 1957 he has been acting only
as an executive or administrative inquisitor.
46. 99 N.H. 33,105 A.2d 756 (1954).
47. Id. at 45, 105 A.d at 767.
48. This quotation is taken from a statement which Sweezy read at the
outset of his attendance, and which is quoted in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 239-40 n.6 (1957).
49. DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 368 U.S. 19 (1961), affirming 103 N.H.
214, 169 A.2d 1; Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 US. 388 (1960), appeal dismissed, 102
N.H. 561, 159 A.2d 160; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), affirming 101
N.H. 139, 136 A2d 221 (1957); Uphaus v. Wyman, 355 U.. 16 (1957), vacat-
ing judgment in 100 N.H. 436, 180 A.2d 278; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957), reversing 100 N.H. 103, 121 A.2d 783 (1956).
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prisonment of Willard Uphaus than it has upon that of Udall, Bunyan
or the many others like them. For this is another of that ever-
lengthening line of cases where people have been sent to prison because
their beliefs were inconsistent with the prevailing views of the mo-
ment .... 50
The two most populous states, California and New York, also
grant their attorneys general inquisitional subpoena powers. In
California, such powers are broadly vested in the head of each
department, for the purpose of investigating any violation "of
any law or rule or order of the department."'" In a recent case,
Brovelli v. Superior Court,52 the California Supreme Court, al-
though annulling a contempt order because it was based on a
default order, nevertheless validated an investigative subpoena
duces tecum of a deputy attorney general, relying on the grand
jury analogy and United States v. Morton Salt Co.58 New York's
attorney general has investigative subpoena powers under no less
than seven different statutory provisions. The broadest one
permits him to
inquire into matters concerning the public peace, public safety and
public justice ... to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance,
examine them under oath before himself or a magistrate and require
the production of any books or papers which he deems relevant or
material to the inquiry. .... "
The remaining six grant similar powers for investigations into
50. 364 U.S. at 400. Brooks Atkinson, critic at large of The New York
Times, ended a recent piece on Uphaus with the comment: "If the law made
some provision for common sense an upright citizen of advanced years would
not have had to spend a year in jail." Atkinson, Critic at Large, N.Y. Times, July
30, 1963, p. 26, cols. 1, 2. Uphaus restated his case in his autobiographical,
UPHAUS, COMMITMNENT (1963).
51. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11180, 11181.
52. 56 Cal. 2d 524, 364 P.2d 462, 15 Cal. Rep. 630 (1961).
53. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). The California court stated:
There is no constitutional objection to a system under which the heads
of departments of government may compel the production of evidence
for purposes of investigation, without instituting formal proceedings
against the one from whom the evidence is sought or filing charges
against him. As has been said by the United States Supreme Court,
the power to make administrative inquiry is not derived from a judicial
function but is more analogous to the power of a grand jury, which
does not depend on a case or controversy in order to get evidence but
can investigate "merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not."
56 Cal. 2d at 529, 364 P.2d at 465, 15 Cal. Rep. at 633.
54. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 63(8).
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violations of more specific laws.55 The New York Court of Ap-
peals supported the state's official inquisitors generously. Indeed,
some of its early decisions foretold the acceptance of secret
administrative investigations. 8 Four recent decisions, three by
the Court of Appeals, graphically illustrate the breadth of the
New York Attorney General's inquisitional subpoena power.57
55. N.Y. ExEcu-rvE Liw § 63(12) (fraud or illegality in the transaction of
business), § 69 (crimes against the elective franchise); N.Y. Gmr. Bus. LAw
§ S43 (monopolies), § 352 (violations of Blue Sky law); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw
§ 109(b)(6) (usurpation of office or franchise); N.Y. Gm. Corn. LAw § 92(2)
(unlawful exercise of corporate franchise).
The change in New York on September 1, 1963 from the old Civil Practice
Act to the new Civil Practice Law and Rules may give rise to a legal question
in three of the seven instances as to the attorney general's investigative sub-
poena powers. N.Y. GN. Cori. LAw § 92(2), as well as N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr
§ 1217(3) and N.Y. ExxcuTIvE LAw § 63(12), all authorize the attorney gen-
eral to proceed "in the manner provided in" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 406. Section
406(1) provided for investigative as well as adjudicatory subpoenas. But N.Y.
Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 902(a), the corresponding provision, contemplates only
adjudicatory subpoenas. See generally 2 WEInSTEIN, KORN & mnitrIn, NEw
YoRnCrvnPRACTIcE 202.01-.14 (1963).
In the investigations of monopolies the attorney general has the benefit of
a compulsory testimony provision. N.Y. Gm. Bus. LAw § 343. Recalcitrance
in such investigations is a misdemeanor "punishable by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both." N.Y. GmN'. Bus. LAw § 343. Recalcitrance in Blue Sky investigations is
likewise a misdemeanor, and similarly punishable, except that the fine limit
is $500. N.Y. Gm. Bus. LAw § 359-g(2).
56. In one early case, Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N.Y. 423, 154 N.E. 298
(1926), the court compared the Martin Act, N.Y. Gm2. Bus. LAw § 352, to
several similar statutes, all of which had been upheld as constitutional and
valid. Another early case, Ottinger v. Civil Service Comm'n, 240 N.Y. 435,
148 N.. 627 (1925), stressed the benefits of secrecy in an administrative in-
vestigation under the Martin Act: "Secrecy is essential, not only for the
prosecution of the guilty, but also for the protection of the innocent, who
might be ruined in business or reputation if the mere fact that they were
under investigation were to become known to the public." Id. at 438-39, 148
N.E. at 627. This case, and People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162
N.E. 487 (1928), involving a judicial inquirer, were cited by the district court
as well as by the Second Circuit in In re SEC, 14 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 84 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir.), rev'd for mootness sub -nom. Bracken v. SEC.
299 U.S. 504 (1936).
57. LaBelle Creole Int'l v. Attorney Gen., 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E.2d 705,
219 N.Y.Sad 1 (1961) (subpoena duces tecum of the records of a Panama
corporation with its principal place of business in Haiti, but which advertised
its "duty-free liquor service" in New York newspapers); In the Matter of
Attorney Gen., 10 N.Y.2d 108, 176 N.E.2d 402, 217 N.Y.S.2d 603, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 947 (1961) (subpoena duces tecum upon Nicolas Darvas and the
publisher of his best selling book, How I Made $2,000,000 in the Stock
Market); In re Di Brizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.2d 464 (1951) (the governor
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Delaware's attorney general and any deputy have broad power
"to compel the attendance of persons and witnesses at the office
of the Attorney General, or at such other place designated," and
they "may administer oaths and affirmations to any person in-
cluding witnesses, at any time or in any place. '' 8 The Delaware
designated certain "officers of the Department of Law" as the New York
Crime Commission to investigate, with subpoena powers, the relationship be-
tween organized crime and units of government in the state); North End Demo-
cratic Club v. Lefkowitz, 31 Misc. 2d 1000, 222 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
(subpoena duces tecum for the Club's "general ledgers and general journals,"
including but not limited to copies of souvenir journals and treasurer reports
for the past three years, was proper).
In Lawrence Aluminum Indus. Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 20 Misc. 2d 739, 190
N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1960) the court sustained the attorney general's sub-
poenas duces tecum in an investigation of "bait" advertising. In Syracuse
Co-op. Milk Distribs. Bargaining Agency, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 13 Misc. 2d
26, 177 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1958), the court sustained such a subpoena
in an investigation of the marketing of milk, despite a claim that the peti-
tioner was exempt.
The fact that petitioner, its members, and their activities within its
capacity as a milk distributors' bargaining agency may be exempt from
antimonopoly restrictions of the Donnelly Act and that they may there-
fore be immune from prosecution by respondent, if that be so, does
not invalidate the subpoena sought to be vacated.
Id. at 29, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 110. In Schiff v. Attorney Gen., 4 Misc. 2d 1018,
163 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1956), the court accepted the attorney general's
sworn declaration that he was proceeding officially on complaints of question-
able securities activities which, in the public interest, could not safely be
disclosed. But cf. Kates v. Lefkowitz, 28 Misc. 2d 210, 216 N.Y.S.2d 1014
(Sup. Ct. 1961), in which the court, on the application of an owner of an
apartment development in Rye, New York, and one of its principal officers,
vacated a monopoly investigation subpoena of the attorney general "based
upon a complaint by a Negro woman that they had refused to rent a vacant
apartment to her." Id. at 211, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 1015-16.
In In the Matter of Bowers, 203 Misc. 653, 121 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct.
1952), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1st Dep't 1953), involving
investigative subpoenas of the State Crime Commission and In the Matter of
Marcus, 139 Misc. 675, 248 N.Y. Supp. 219 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 731.
247 N.Y. Supp. 1008 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 255 N.Y. 630, 175 N.E.
844 (1931), involving investigative subpoenas of Max D. Steuer appointed as a
deputy attorney general to inquire into the acts and practices of the Bank of
the United States, the courts held that these officials could conduct their
investigative hearings in public if they so chose. Moreover, in People v. Spiak,
11 Misc. 2d 1043, 175 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958), the court, in adjudg-
ing a subpoenaed witness guilty of a misdemeanor under N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 343 for refusing to answer a question when ordered to do so by the officer
conducting such inquiry under that statute, held that the compulsory testi-
mony provision relating to monopoly investigations did not have to protect
against the danger of federal prosecution.
58. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 29, § 2505(a) (Supp. 1962).
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Supreme Court in a recent case, In 'e Hawkins,"9 gave full effect
to this grant and, relying on the grand jury analogy, held that
the attorney general's subpoena did not have to show the nature
of the inquiry or the purpose of the demandP°
In Kansas, the attorney general, judicial inquirers, and county
attorneys, have inquisitional subpoena powers under the laws
relating to gambling, intoxicating liquors, fugitives, monopolies,
and unfair trade practicesY' Recalcitrance is a misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum fine of five hundred dollars, or im-
prisonment for not more than six months, or both.62 There is a
compulsory testimony provision,63 and the Kansas Supreme
Court, in characteristic fashion, applied it narrowly against sub-
poenaed witnesses; it held that compelled testimony could be
used against them in ouster proceedings, because these were civil
and not criminal in character."
59. 50 Del. 61, 128 A.2d 113 (1956), affirmng 49 Del. 544, 121 A-.d 486
(Super. Ct.).
60.
The simple answer to this contention [that the subpoena must show
the subject matter of the investigation] is that the limits of the investi-
gation and the relevancy of the documents sought are matters which
are of no concern to the witness. Such is the rule when a witness is
called before a grand jury .... and we think it equally applicable
when he is summoned before the Attorney General.
50 Del. at 64, 66, 128 A.2d at 115, 116. In the later case of In the Matter of
Henry C. Eastburn & Son, Inc., 51 Del. 446, 147 A.2d 921 (1959), the court,
although sustaining the attorney general's subpoenas duces tecum seeking the
witnesses' contributions to political parties for three years, did concede that
this official's powers were not unlimited: "We also agree that the Attorney
General's investigatory powers, though broad... [citing In re Hawkins, supra
50 Del. 61, 123 A.2d 118 (1956)] are not to be equated with those of the
Grand Jury. Thus the Attorney General has no power of presentment." Id.
at 451, 147 A-2d at 924.
61. KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1609 (1949).
62. KAN. GEN. STAT. AxN. § 60-1619 (1949).
63. KANr. GsEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1620 (1949).
64. State ex rel. Smith v. Duncan, 184 Kan. 85, 4 Pad 443 (1931).
Various states have statutes similar to either of the seven New York
statutes or the several Kansas statutes that give subpoena powers to their
attorneys general in the investigations of monopolies or violations of Blue Sky
laws. The Maine attorney general has such power in investigations of "all
contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce,
and all monopolies." MEU. REv. STAT. A.Nx. ch. 137, § 48 (1954). Although the
Maryland attorney general had such power in investigations under its Blue
Sky Law, MD. ANN. CoDE art. 32A, § 16 (1957), it is not vested in a Se-
curities Commissioner appointed by him, Mn. ANN. COD art. 32A, §§ 30,
31 (Supp. 1962). The new act also contains a compulsory testimony provi-
sion. M . ANN. CoDnn art. 32A, § 31(d) (Supp. 1962). The Missouri attorney
1964]
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4. Prosecutor
A number of states give inquisitional subpoena powers to their
local prosecutors, variously called state's attorneys, district
attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, county attorneys, and county
solicitors. Florida grants to a county solicitor "the process of his
court to summon witnesses to appear before him in or out of
term time, at such convenient places and time as may be desig-
nated in the summons, to testify before him as to any violation
of the criminal law upon which they may be interrogated."Ol
For inquisitions into violations of the state's election code and
of its liquor law, there are compulsory testimony provisions."U
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the compulsory testi-
mony act in its election code applies to a municipal primary, and
further ruled that a subpoenaed witness did not have to claim
his privilege to obtain immunity.17
general has such power, supplemented by a compulsory testimony provision,
in monopoly investigations. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 416.310, .330 (1959). The pro-
cedure is for the attorney general to apply to any justice of the supreme
court for an order, and the testimony is taken before a justice of the su-
preme court or any examiner designated in the order. New Jersey, like Mary-
land, gave its attorney general inquisitional subpoena power under its Blue
Sky Law, N.J. REV. STAT. § 49:1-5 (1963), and now gives it to the chief of
the Bureau of Securities, appointed by him. N.J. REV. STAT. § 49:3-16 (1963).
In both instances there was a compulsory testimony provision. N.J. REv.
STAT. §§ 49:1-19, 3-16 (1963). The attorneys general of North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin have such powers in the
investigation of monopolies. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-10, -11 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 79, § 29 (1961); S.C. CODE tit. 66, §§ 66-111 to 66-116 (1962);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 7439, 7446 (1948); WiS. STAT. §§ 183.06, .20
(1961). North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas provide their attorneys gen-
eral with the power to compel testimony. The procedure in Oklahoma and
Texas is comparable to that in Missouri. South Carolina provides for the
taking of testimony before a justice of the supreme court, a circuit judge,
or a referee, as well as the attorney general, and, in that event, adds a com-
pulsory testimony provision.
65. FLA. STAT. § 32.20 (1961); cf. Coleman v. State ex rel. King, 134
Fla. 802, 184 So. 334 (1938). In Campbell v. State, 92 Fla. 775, 109 So. 809
(1926), the court held the county solicitor empowered to administer oaths
only to witnesses subpoenaed for him by the process of his court; but a
statute now gives him power to administer oaths not only to such witnesses
but also "to all witnesses who may voluntarily appear before him to testify
to any violation or violations of the criminal law." FLA. STAT. § 32.22 (1061).
66. FLA. STAT. § 104.39 (election code), § 568.08 (liquor law) (1961).
67. State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 121 Fla. 822, 164 So. 872 (1935).
But in State ex rel. Hickland v. Coleman, 137 Fla. 102, 188 So. 81 (1939),
the court held that the subpoenaed witness did not obtain immunity because
his testimony did not throw any light on the offenses which the county so-
[Vol. 48:557
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In the enforcement of its liquor law, Idaho grants inquisitional
subpoena powers, together with a compulsory testimony provi-
sion, to the prosecuting attorney of any county, as well as the
director of enforcement of the department of law enforcement."
New Mexico empowers any of its prosecuting attorneys, on
approval of the district judge, to "issue subpoenas in felony
cases and call witnesses ...when the grand jury is not in
session and have ... their testimony reduced to writing and
signed by the witnesses." 69 Thus, in felony cases, New Mexico
accomplishes by statute what counsel for the federal govern-
ment in United States v. Standard Oil Co ° sought to do without.
5. Public Examiner
Minnesota's public examiner and New York City's Comp-
troller and Commissioner of Investigation all have inquisitional
subpoena powers. The Minnesota public examiner has "the duty
and power to supervise all public accounts," 71 and to this end
may exercise "the powers possessed by courts of law to issue
subpoenas and cause them to be served and enforced."7" Recal-
citrance is "a felony, the minimum penalty whereof shall be a
fine of $1,000, or imprisonment in the state prison for one year. ' 73
The Minnesota Supreme Court, referring to these powers, said
that "the public examiner is given the powers possessed by the
courts in the matter of securing testimony, thus conferring judi-
cial authority to be exercised in the manner prescribed for
courts.' ' 74 Moreover, the court, somewhat contrary to its ruling
in State v. Rion75 in which it decided that testimony given
before the state fire marshal could not be used to obtain a grand
jury indictment of the subpoenaed witness, held, in State v.
Gensmer,76 that a transcription of a statement that the defend-
licitor was investigating. In State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So. 2d
907 (Fla. 1948), the court held that the state's compulsory testimony provi-
sions did not cover "criminal communism."
68. IDAHo CoDs ANx. § 23-807 (1948).
69. N.. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-8 (Supp. 1961).
70. 316 F.ad 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
71. MiN . STAT. § 215.01 (1961).
72. MAIn. STAT. § 215.16 (1961).
73. Mmw. STAT. § 215.17 (1961).
74. State ex 7el. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Mnn. 116, 120, 154 N.W. 750,
752 (1915).
75. 180 :Mlnn. 573, 231 N.W. 217 (1930).
76. 235 Minn. 72, 51 N.W.2d 680 (1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
cf. State v. Lowrie, 235 ]inn. 82, 49 N.W.2d 631 (1951); State v. Nolan,
231 Mlnn. 522, 44 N.W.2d 66 (1950). In State v. Lowrie, Justice Thomas
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ant gave to a representative of the public examiner's office could
be used in evidence against him in a prosecution under a bribery
statute.
The comptroller of New York City has investigative subpoena
power "to investigate all matters relating to or affecting the
finances of the city. ' '7 ' In addition, the state of New York gives
its cities broad powers to subpoena witnesses for investigations
"into all matters of concern to the city or its inhabitants. 7 8
New York City accordingly has a Department of Investigation,
headed by a Commissioner, who is to make any investigation
directed by the mayor or the council, and may subpoena wit-
nesses79 to implement "any study or investigation which in his
opinion may be in the best interests of the city.""0 Moreover,
he may "examine witnesses in public or private hearings."'
The New York courts gave ample support to the inquisitions
conducted by these officials.82 In an early case, Matter of Edge
Ho Holding Corp., Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned for a unanimous
court:
Investigation will be paralyzed if arguments as to materiality or rclc-
vance, however appropriate at the hearing, are to be transferred upon
a doubtful showing to the stage of a preliminary contest as to the
obligation of the writ. Prophecy in such circumstances will step into
the place that description and analysis may occupy more safely. Only
where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is
inevitable or obvious must there be a halt upon the threshold.83
This was another of the early decisions of the New York Court
Gallagher, dissenting, cited State v. Rixon; the next year, in State v. Lowrie,
237 Minn. 240, 54 N.W.2d 265 (1952), he wrote the court's opinion holding
the indictment insufficient to charge attempted bribery.
77. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 93b.
78. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2).
79. N.Y. Crr CHARER § 805a.
80. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 803.
81. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 805b.
82. See, e.g., Dairymen's League Co-op. v. Murtagh, 299 N.Y. 034, 86
N.E.2d 509 (1949); Blitzer v. Bromberger, 295 N.Y. 596, 64 N.E.2d 290
(1945); Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537 (1931);
Hirschfield v. Hanley, 228 N.Y. 346, 127 N.E. 252 (1920); Hirschficld v.
Cook, 227 N.Y. 297, 125 N.E. 504 (1919); Matter of Hertle, 120 App. Div.
717, 728, 105 N.Y. Supp. 765, 772 (1st Dep't 1945); Matter of Weiner, 183
Misc. 267, 49 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Matter of Comptroller, 181
Misc. 860, 48 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Matter of Chase Nat'l Bank,
155 Misc. 595, 280 N.Y. Supp. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1935); cf. People v. Komblith,
296 N.Y. 738, 70 N.E.2d 547 (1946). But cf. Matter of Ellis, 176 Misc.
887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
83. 256 N.Y. 374, 381-82, 176 N.E. 537, 539 (1931).
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of Appeals that predicated the growth of administrative inves-
tigations.
In a more recent case, Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n v.
Murtagh," the Appellate Division, First Department, sustained
a subpoena duces teeum of the Commissioner of Investigation
over the objection that the information he sought, regarding
secret credit allowances by the Dairymen's League to retail
stores, was confidential and involved trade secrets. The court
relied on Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion in the Edge Ho case and
introduced a quotation from it with the statement: "A subpoena
duces tecum of the Commissioner of Investigation may not be
vacated unless the person subpoenaed can demonstrate that it
calls for documents which are utterly irrelevant to any proper
inquiry." 5 In most instances, such a burden would be impos-
sible to meet08
6. The Governor
Just as the federal government has given inquisitional sub-
poena powers to the President, so the states of Arizona, Florida,
New York, and perhaps California, have given such powers to
their governors . 7 Arizona, in its Civil Defense Act of 1951, so
empowers its governor "for the purpose of making surveys and
investigations and obtaining information, but not for investiga-
tion of subversive activities which are the responsibility of the
federal bureau of investigation."88 New York's governor has
such powers pursuant to an authorization "at any time, either
in person or by one or more persons appointed by him for the
purpose, to examine and investigate the management and affairs
8s4. 299 N.Y. 634, 86 N.E-2d 509 (1949), affirning per curiam 274 App.
Div. 591, 84 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dep't 1948).
85. 274 App. Div. at 595, 84 N.YS.2d at 764.
86. The situation has to be one where the inquiring official is clearly acting
beyond the scope of his authority, as in Herlands v. Sutherland, 170 Misc.
181, 9 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct.), affd without opinion, 257 App. Div. 935, 1s
N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1939), af'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 708, 48 N.E2d
91 (1942), in which the courts held that the Commissioner of Investigation
had no authority to conduct a survey as to the methods and procedures of
the clerks of the Supreme Court in Kings County. For comparable illustra-
tions, see Curtis v. Herlands, 38 N.Y.Sed 964 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Mkatter of
Bromberger (Erickson), 187 Aisc. 593, 62 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 19-46).
87. ARIz. [lv. STAT. ANN. § 26-346 (1956); CAL,. Gov'T CoDE §§ 11180,
11181; T_ . STAT. §§ 21.19(3), 377.82(1), 424.05, 110.02(1), .12 (1961); N.Y.
Ex ux-x LAw § 6.
88. ARiz. R-v. STAT. AN . § 26-346 (1956).
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of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state.""9
Under this provision the governor of New York has appointed
(1) a committee to investigate the state departments, including
state hospitals for the insane, (2) a group known as the More-
land Commission to investigate the administration of the Work-
men's Compensation Law of New York, and (8) a Commission
to Investigate Harness Racing. The New York courts have
sustained the subpoena power of all of these bodies. 0
California, as has been pointed out, gives inquisitional sub-
poena power to the head of each department." This probably
includes its governor as head of the executive department.
7. Commission of Investigation
New York, in addition to its existing administrative agencies
with inquisitional subpoena powers, created a State Commission
of Investigation, that was to last until 1963;11 in 1962 the life
of this temporary commission was extended until 196501 The
Commission can conduct either public or private hearings."' It
can hold its hearings at any place in the state, 5 but like the
United States Civil Rights Commission, it can not take testi-
mony "unless at least two of its members, one of whom shall
be an appointee of the governor and the other an appointee of
either the temporary president of the senate or the speaker of
the assembly, are present at such hearing."9" The Commission
was also instructed to "cooperate with departments and officers
of the United States government in the investigation of violations
of the federal laws" within New York . 7 In a recent case the
89. N.Y. ExEcmTIVE LAW § 6.
90. Alexander v. New York State Comm'n, 806 N.Y. 421, 118 N.E.2d
588 (1954); Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 294 N.Y. 312, 62 N.E.2d 85 (1945);
Weil v. New York State Comm'n, 283 App. Div. 808, 129 N.Y.S.2d 501
(2d Dep't 1954); Schiffman v. Bleakley, 46 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
ef. People v. Anhut, 162 App. Div. 517, 148 N.Y. Supp. 7 (1st Dep't 1914)
(investigation that included an examination into the truth of certain rumors
concerning the existence of a conspiracy to obtain the release of Harry K.
Thaw from Matteawan State Hospital by bribery).
91. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11180, 11181.
92. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 989. Originally, investigations were con-
ducted by the office of the Commissioner of Investigation. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1953, ch. 887, § 1. In 1958, this office was abolished and replaced by the
State Commission of Investigation.
98. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7501 (McKinney Supp. 1963).
94. N.Y. UNcOiqsOL. LAWs § 7502(11)(b) (MeKinney Supp. 1963).
95. N.Y. UNcoisoL. LAWS § 7502(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1963).
96. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 7502(11)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1963).
97. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 7502(5) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
[Vol. 48:557
INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS
New York Court of Appeals sustained one of the Commission's
subpoenas that required the purchasing agent of Albany County
to come to New York City, despite his objection of harassment,
for an investigation of purchasing practices in that county 8
The Commission engaged in strenuous efforts, in cooperation
with officials of the federal government, to find out what tran-
spired at an alleged gangland meeting of the Mafia at the
Appalachin, New York home of the late Joseph Barbara, Sr.
These efforts created a great deal of litigation that supported
the Commission and its investigative subpoena powers 9 Never-
theless, neither the Commission, nor the federal government 00
98. Ryan v. Temporary State Comm'n of Investigation, 12 N.Y.2d 708,
186 NE.2d 121, 233 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1962); accord, Matter of Sears, 1 App.
Div. 2d 848, 149 N.Y.S.-d 285 (2d Dep't 1956); Matter of Frederick, 1 App.
Div. 2d 846, 149 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dep't 1956).
However, the Appellate Division, First Department, in Matter of leuter
(Cosentino), 4 App. Div. 2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1st Dep't 1957), pro-
tected the attorney-client privilege: It held that Joseph (Socks) Lanza's law-
yer, Sylvester Cosentino, did not have to answer the questions of the Com-
missioner of Investigation stemming from a conversation between him and
his client at the Westchester County jaid that state officials surreptitiously
recorded. The Appellate Division, referring to the use of electronic devices
to intercept and record the conversation, said:
The law does not lie helpless because there may arise ingenious fa-
cilities to circumvent its safeguards; it has ingenuity enough of its own
to preserve rights which it regards important; and if the constitutional
guaranty of the aid of counsel is to be of value, the court must afford
to every man the right to talk with his lawyer with the assurance that
the lawyer will not be required or permitted to disclose what is said.
Id. at 254, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 534. But Lanza's brother Harry could be inter-
rogated about a prison-recorded conversation. People v. Lanza, 10 App.
Div. 2d 315, 199 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Yd 895, 175
N.E.9d 833, 216 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139 (1962). Also, the courts would not enjoin the New York
State Joint Committee on Government Operations from making public the
wired conversation between Joseph Lanza and his lawyer. Lanza v. New
York State Joint Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 722, 164
N.Y.S.ed 9, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
99. See, e.g., People v. Costello, 6 N.Y.2d 761, 980, 159 N.-.°d 205, 161
N.E.2d 741, 186 N.Y.Sd 660, 191 N.YS.2d 957 (1959); Commission of
Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.2.ed o50, 185 N.Y.S.2d
550, cert. denied sub no. Mancuso v. Commission of Investigation, 301 Us.
10 (1959), Miranda v. Commission of Investigation, 360 U.S. 930 (1959).
100. The federal government prosecuted 23 of the individuals in attend-
ance at the Appalachin meeting under a mass conspiracy indictment charging
them with conspiring to obstruct justice. Although convicted, their convic-
tions were reversed on appeal for lack of evidence. United States v. Bufalino,
285 F-2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960), Teversing United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp.
106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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found out what took place. Nor did the fact that the Commis-
sion had the benefit of a compulsory testimony act help matters;
even though, in two of these cases the New York courts held,
citing the United States Supreme Court's narrow decision in
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 1' that a state immunity statute did not
have to protect against the danger of federal prosecution.
The Commission's inquisitions into the Appalachin meeting
illustrate the futility of compulsory testimony provisions."0 2
After the many unsuccessful efforts of federal and state officials
to find out what happened at Appalachin, Mafia member Joseph
Valachi, in prison on a narcotics conviction, began telling the
FBI- which does not have the benefit of a compulsory testi-
mony provision - what happened. 0 3
8. Agriculture Department
A sampling of states from the least to the most populous in
this and the following sections will fill in the broad outlines of
the investigative subpoena powers of state officials and bodies.
Just as the federal government in six different statutes has
granted inquisitional subpoena powers to officials of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, many states have given such powers to
similar officials of comparable units of state government.
Arizona gives inquisitional subpoena powers to its agricultural
prorate commissioner. 104 The director of the California depart-
ment of agriculture has general subpoena powers as the head
of a department 05 Similar powers are granted specifically by
three additional acts, 06 the last of which contains a compulsory
testimony provision.
Colorado grants such powers to the eight member state agri-
cultural commission'0 7 as well as to the commissioner of agricul-
ture'08 and Michigan to the director of markets.'0° The Minne-
101. 857 U.S. 371 (1958).
102. For a fuller treatment of the author's position, see RoaaE. Tin
FIRST AND THE FFTH 269-78 (1960).
103. See Maas, Mafia: The Inside Story, Sat. Eve. Post, Aug. 10, 1903,
p. 19. According to Maas, "at long last, the Justice Department learned (from
Valachi] the real reasons behind the famous meeting of underworld chieftains
in 1957 at Appalachin, New York." Id. at 19-20.
104. Apuz. Rnv. STAT. AN. § 3-403 (1956).
105. CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 20; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11180, 11181.
106. CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 1155, 1267, 1800.22.
107. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-6(5) (Supp. 1960).
108. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-5-6 (1953).
109. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.72 (1958).
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sota commissioner of agriculture has subpoena powers under two
different acts,'1 the latter of which contains a compulsory testi-
mony provision."' Mississippi grants similar powers to the Mis-
sissippi Milk Commission or any duly designated employee,1 -
and Missouri to the commissioner of agriculture in the investiga-
tion of unfair milk sales practices" 3 and under the Missouri grain
warehouse law."14
New York gives sweeping investigative subpoena powers and
the-power to compel testimony to the commissioner of its depart-
ment of agriculture and markets. " Recalcitrance, including re-
fusal to subscribe and swear to a deposition, is a misdemeanor."6
An act relating to milk and milk products again gives broad in-
quisitional powers.n 7
9. Health Department
In Arkansas the board of health or its secretary may issue sub-
poenas in the investigation of violations of an act relating to milk,
ice cream, and dairy products."11 In California the director of the
state department of public health and its state board of public
health both have broad inquisitional subpoena powers. " Cali-
fornia also gives such powers to its state department of public
health in investigations under an act dealing with cancer and pro-
vides that the hearings may be held before a cancer advisory
council.V 0
110. Wm-N. Su.&. §§ 17.17, 32A.05(1961).
111. ARNW. STAT. § 32A.05(s) (1961).
112. ms. CODE AxN. §§ 4560-147, -158 (Supp. 1962).
113. Mo. knv. STAT. § 416.465 (1959).
114. MO. REV. STAT. § 411.490 (1959).
115. N.Y. AGmc. & MKTs. LAw §§ 32-84.
116. N.Y. AGRIc..& MxTs. LA.w § 34(3).
117. N.Y. AunIc. & MxTs. LAw § 254(b). This section and § 34 axe affected
by the change in New York on September 1, 1963 from N.Y. Civ. PRuc. Acr
§ 406(1), which provided for investigative as well as adjudicatory subpoenas,
to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & Rt. § 2302(a), which contemplates only adjudicatory
subpoenas. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 310, §§ 11, 12, 34. See generally 2
WEmNsTF, ]oR & MumR, Naw Yonn Clvm PnAcTiCE 2302.01-.14
(1963). Whether courts in the enforcement of administrative inquisitional
subpoenas under affected sections will continue to follow old traces, remains
to be seen.
For an early case sustaining the investigative subpoena power of the com-
missioner of agriculture, see In re Fenton, 58 Misc. 303, 109 N.Y. Supp. 321
(Sup. Ct. 1908).
118. A K. ST.T. AwN. § 82-918(7) (1960).
119. CA. HEIAIT & SAFETY CODE §§ 20, 102; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11180,
11181.
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1704.
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Missouri gives broad inquisitional powers to the director of the
department of public health and welfare,'12 1 and New York to the
commissioners of its departments of public health 12 2 and mental
hygiene.ss As if these grants were not sufficient, New York addi-
tionally gives such powers to (1) the commissioner of the mental
hygiene department in the investigation of alien and nonresident
mentally afflicted persons;12 4 (2) the same official in the investiga-
tion of the financial condition of those in the institutions under
his jurisdiction and of those legally responsible for their support; 12
(3) the board of visitors, consisting of seven members, of each in-
stitution in the department of mental hygiene;12 and (4) the
director of each such institution or his designated officer. 27
10. Civil Service Commission
A considerable number of states has granted inquisitional sub-
poena powers to civil service commissions and similar agencies
with various titles. 28 In New York, for example, the state civil
service commission and several subordinate officials and agencies
have investigative subpoena powers;129 they possess "all the
powers conferred by the legislative law upon a committee of the
legislature.' ' 30 In an early case, People ex rel. Bender v. Milli-
ken, ' the court of appeals, in refusing to restrain the state civil
121. Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.050 (1959).
122. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 12-a.
123. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 7(8), 8(5); see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909,
ch. 310, §§ 272, 273.
124. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 23(8); see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch.
310, § 275.
125. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(5).
126. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 32(7).
127. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 34(13); see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch.
310, § 277.
128. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1310, -1411, -1510, -1610 (1956); CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 18671; CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-1-7 (Supp. 1960); MINN. STAT.
§ 43.07 (civil service board), §§ 419.11, .80 (police civil service commissions),
§ 420.12 (firemen's civil service commissions) (1961); MIss. CODE ANN. §§
3825-06, -35 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 36.400 (personnel advisory board)
(1949).
129. N.Y. Cry. SERv. LAW §§ 6(3), (4), 9, 21; see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1902,
ch. 310, § 67.
130. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 6(4).
181. 185 N.Y. 35, 77 N.E. 872 (1906).
The function so performed by the commission is strictly analogous to
that of a legislative committee of inquiry of investigation. It is not
a valid objection to such an investigation that it may disclose crime or
wrongdoing on the part of the individuals, provided its object is the
framing and enactment of proper laws or regulations....
INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS
service commission from an investigation, analogized it to a legis-
lative committee.
11. Corporation Commission
Many state corporation commissioners have investigative sub-
poena powers and some have the additional authority to compel
testimony in their investigations.' In Arizona, the corporation
commission and its members have inquisitional subpoena powers
both by constitution and statute. The constitution empowers it
"to inspect and investigate the property, books, papers, business,
methods, and affairs of any corporation whose stock shall be
offered for sale to the public and of any public service corporation
doing business within the State.' ' s The statute adds a compulsory
testimony provision.3 4 The powers of this body are usually exer-
cised in other states by public utilities commissions and public
service commissions, as well as corporation commissions. Michi-
gan, in addition to its corporation and securities commission, has
a public trust commission with investigative subpoena powers to
protect the interests of holders of defaulted securities. " '
12. Liquor Control Commission
The necessity of supervising the flow of liquor in intrastate
commerce has led several states to grant investigative subpoena
powers to liquor control commissions. 30 In New York, the state
liquor authority, the alcoholic beverage control board of the city
of New York, and the county alcoholic beverage control boards,
all have such powers. 37 The rules of the state liquor authority
provide for counsel in adjudicative hearings,' but not in investi-
gative proceedings.
Id. at 40, 77 NE. at 873; see Conway v. Kaney, 274 App. Div. 849, 80
N.Y.S.2d 770 (4th Dep't 1948) (memorandum) (subpoenas of the state civil
service commission enforced).
132. AIA. CoDE tit. 53, §§ 2, 28 (1958), § 42 (Supp. 1961); AL~sAK STAT.
§ 45.55.190 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1253 (Supp. 1963); CA. Coar. CODE
§§ 25352, 25354; CoLO. REv. STAT. Ai"T. § 125-10-18 (Supp. 1961); MIcr.
STAT. ANN. § 19.767 (1959).
133. Anz. CoNsT. art. 15, § 4.
134. ARm. REV. STAT. ANT. § 40-241, -244 (1956).
135. AcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1802 (1962).
186. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-112 (Supp. 1903); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-
1310(4) (Supp. 1963); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.977(1) (1957); Miss. CODE ,m.
§§ 2620, 2621 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 311.660(8) (1959).
137. N.Y. ALco. Bav. COTOL LAw §§ 17(10), 43(4); see N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1962, ch. 310, §§ 39, 40.
138. Rules of State Liquor Authority, Rule 49, in N.Y. Arco. BEy. Cox-
TR oL LAw, App.
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13. Public Utilities Commission
California and Colorado each have a public utilities commis-
sion, and Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, and New
York have a public service commission, with investigative sub-
poena powers. 139
The Arkansas public service commission and commerce com-
mission now function in the former sphere of the transportation
division of the public service commission. These bodies have in-
vestigative subpoena powers under five different statutory provi-
sions, the first and third of which also contain compulsory testi-
mony provisions. 4 '
California grants inquisitional subpoena powers both by con-
stitution and statute. Its statute grants them to the public utilities
commission, each commissioner, the secretary and the assistant
secretaries. The state's constitution further empowers the com-
mission and each commissioner to "punish for contempt in the
same manner and to the same extent as courts of record.... " 4
Missouri has not only a public service commission with inqui-
sitional subpoena powers on a statewide basis, but also a public
utilities commission with such powers for each city of the first
class;141 in each instance there is a compulsory testimony provi-
sion.'"
.New York's public service commission, any commissioner, and
any officer or employee of the commission specially authorized to
conduct an investigation, have broad inquisitional subpoena
powers under no less than seven different statutory provisions. To
begin with, they have a broad general grant of such powers and a
compulsory testimony provision.4 They further have such powers
under five additional grants relating to (1) railroads, street rail-
roads, and common carriers (2) omnibuses (8) gas and electric
corporations (4) steam corporations and (5) water-works corpora-
tions. A sixth statutory grant vests the commission and each
139. ALA. CODE tit. 48, §§ 55-57, 59, 60 (1958); CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 22;
CAL. PUB. UTm. CODE § 311; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-2-0, 115-0-2.
115-6-3 (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 22.13(4) (Supp. 1961); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7689 (Supp. 1962), § 7811 (1957); Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.320(3) (1959);
N.Y. Pus. SERv. LAw §§ 19, 20, 45, 47, 48, 61(8)-(10), 60(8)-(11), 80(7)-
(9), 89-c(7)-(9), 94, 96.
140. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-123, -130, -131, -222, -1736 (1957).
141. CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 22.
142. Mo. R v. STAT. § 73.820 (1959).
143. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 73.840, 386.470 (1959).
144. N.Y. Pus. SERV. LAw § 20.
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commissioner with such powers over telephone and telegraph
companies. 45 The rules of the commission provide for counsel in
adjudicatory hearings,14 but not in investigative proceedings.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in an early case, People v.
Swena,147 held that a statutory provision giving its public utilities
commission power to punish "for contempt in the same manner
and to the same extent as contempt is punished by courts of
record" was unconstitutional: "The power to punish for contempt
is a judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution. It be-
longs exclusively to the courts, except in cases where the Consti-
tution confers such power upon some other body. '148
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State ex Tel. R.R.
& Warehouse Com'n v. Mees49 represents the outer jurisdic-
tional limit of the judicial enforcement of administrative inquisi-
tional subpoenas. In connection with an investigation of a transit
company, the Commission subpoenaed the records of a brokerage
firm that handled the stock of the transit company. An intervenor
suggested that the use of the subpoena power against persons not
subject to the Commission's regulation would be unconstitutional
unless restricted to quasi-judicial proceedings. The court dis-
agreed, relying on the line of cases that began with United States
v. Morton Salt Co.,,5 and reasoning that
so long as the investigation is for a lawfully authorized purpose and the
information sought relevant and material to the investigation, we
cannot see where due process is offended by requiring any person pos-
sessed of that information to testify.151
14. Tax Commission
One of the most common state agencies with investigative sub-
poena powers is the tax commission'5 2 Although judicial treat-
ment of these agencies has been varied, the courts generally have
145. N.Y. PuB. SEnv. LAw § 94.
146. Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission, Rule H1(2), in
N.Y. PUB. SEnv. LAw, App.
147. 88 Colo. 337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931).
148. Id. at 340, 296 Pac. at 272.
149. 935 Minn 42,49 N.W.2d 386 (1951).
150. 388 U.S. 632 (1950).
151. 235 Minn. at 53, 49 N.W.2d at 393.
152. ARz. lREv. Sr.&:r. Aim. § 42-1505 (estate tax commissioner), § 28-1505
(1956); Aux. STAT. ANx. § 48-203(g) (1947), §§ 84-1840, -2507(e) (1900),
§ 63-106 (commissioner of revenues), § 63-111 (appraisers) (1947); CAL. Gov'r
CODE § 15613; CoLO. IRav. SwTr. ANN. § 137-6-25 (Colorado tax commission),
§ 138-1-42 (director of revenue) (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 7.206 (state tax
commission), § 7.657(S) (state commissioner of revenue) (1960), § 7A11(17)
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upheld the empowering provisions. In Redding Pine Mills, Ino. v.
State Bd. of Equalization5" a California court, relying on the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in the Mees case, held that
the state board of equalization could issue investigative subpoenas
to those who neither owned property subject to assessment by it,
nor were required to report to it.
A New York court has sustained investigative subpoenas of a
town board of assessors'54 despite the fact that this body did not
have any specific grant of such powers. Moreover, the corporation
against whom the subpoenas were directed occupied a plant
created by the United States on land owned by the United States,
although the corporation did have a limited option to buy.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in In re Sanford,"" extended an
implied contempt power to a county board of equalization. The
statutory provision in question gave subpoena powers to a county
board of equalization "in relation to any appeal before them."' 0
The petitioner, seeking his release on habeas corpus from the
custody of the sheriff where he was held for contempt under a
commitment issued by the county board of equalization, con-
tended that the subpoena powers in question were for the benefit
of appealing taxpayers only. The court not only created a pre-
viously non-existent power; it further indicated that these powers
in the hands of the board were inquisitional. The petitioner con-
tended that at least the board itself did not have power to commit
for contempt. Again the court ruled adversely, implying such a
power:
(department of revenue) (Supp. 1961), § 7.301 (secretary of state), §§ 7.253,
.251 (state board of assessors) (1960); Mo. REv. STAT. § 138.360(1) (state tax
commission generally), § 151.060 (state tax commission as to railroads and
street railroads), § 136.090 (state collector of revenue generally), § 136.100(2)
(compulsory testimony provision), § 142.170(2) (state collector of revenue
as to motor vehicle fuel taxes) (1959), § 145.160(1) (appraisers), § 138.040
(county boards of equalization), § 138.170(2) (board of equalization St. Louis
city), § 144.645 (director of revenue) (Supp. 1962); MINN. STAT. §§ 290.60-.58
(commissioner of taxation), § 291.24 (appraisers) (1961); MIsS. CoDs ANN. §
9213-02(b) (Supp. 1962); NEv. REv. STAT. § 360.240 (1961); N.Y. TAx LAw
§ 174 (state tax commission); N.Y. REAL PRoP. TAx LAw § 204 (state board
of equalization and assessment); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 310, §§ 400, 428.
153. 157 Cal. App. 2d 40, 320 P.2d 25, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 818 (1958).
154. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Danowski, 208 Misc. 332,
143 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1955). The court acted under N.Y. CIv. PRAc.
ACT § 406, which was supplanted on September 1, 1963 by N.Y. Civ. PTAc.
L. & R. § 2302(a).
155. 286 Mo. 665, 139 S.W. 376 (1911).
156. Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 138.040(1) (1959).
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What sense would there be in section 11406, which authorizes the board
to subpoena witnesses and send for documents, if it is powerless to
compel the witnesses to testify upon appearance, in obedience to the
subpoenas? None whatever, I submit.157
15. Professional Boards
The 50 states have various professional bodies with inquisi-
tional subpoena powers. For example, attorneys,158 accountants,50
doctors, 60 dentists, 61 podiatrists,ss optometrists,6 3 engineers,'"
veterinarians, 65 cosmetologists,'6 ' masseurs,0 7 embalmers and
funeral directors,'08 and foresters' 9 all are subject to control by a
board or commission with investigative subpoena powers.
California apparently gives such powers to a certified short-
hand reporters board.70 New York apparently gives them to the
commissioner of education or an employee of his department
designated by him in the case of the revocation or suspension of
certificates of psychologists.' 7 '
In Michigan the board of registration in chiropody is em-
powered "to require sworn statements or affidavits from any and
all persons touching or concerning any matter within its jurisdic-
tion," but subpoena power is not specifically given. 72
157. 286 Mo. at 691, 139 S.W. at 383.
158. ALA- CODE tit. 46, §§ 33, 35 (1958); ARIz. RPv. STAT. AN. §§ 32-2069,
-270 (1956); Miss. CODE ANx. §§ 8666(4), 8720 (1956).
159. Ariz. REv. STAT. ANx. § 32-743 (Supp. 1963); Mo. 11Ev. STAT. §
326.170 (1959); N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 7406(2)d.
160. ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 271, 272 (Supp. 1961); COLO. R1Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 91-1-4(2) (1953); Amss. CODE ANN. § 8893(c) (1956); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 334.127 (1959); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6504.
161. ARK. STAT. Aim. § 70-537 (1957); COLO. PEv. STrx. AN-x. § 42-2-10
(Supp. 1961); MN. STAT. § 150.02(2) (1901); N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 6607(2),
6613(5).
162. N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 7004(3), 7011(6).
163. AnK. STAT. Awx. § 72-811(6) (1957); Mo. 1 Ev. STAT. § 336.130(4)
(1959); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 7104(2).
164. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1021(5) (1957); Ais. CODE ANN. § 8791-08
(1956); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 18.84(7) (1957).
165. Mo. R v. STAT. § 340.140(4) (1959).
166. Aim. REv. STAT. AiN. § 32-553(B) (Supp. 1963); CoLO. 11Ev. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1-18(3) (1953).
167. Mm. STAT. § 148.42 (1961).
168. AiK. STAT. ANN. § 71-912 (1957).
169. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 150(8) (Supp. 1961).
170. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8008(e).
171. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 7607(2).
172. Micm. STAT. Aim. § 14.663 (Supp. 1961). M]chigan gives various
of its professional boards subpoena powers, but these grants would seem
to be for adjudicatory purposes. See, e.g., McH. STAT. AxN. § 14.533 (state
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In this area particularly, the many grants of subpoena powers
present a variegated pattern, not only between the different states,
but even within the same state. Where there was a doubt as to
whether such a grant was for adjudicatory or inquisitional pur-
poses, the courts have given the benefit of the doubt to adjudica-
tory subpoenas. For instance, the Kentucky grant of subpoena
powers to the state board of accountancy or any member "in
connection with or at the hearing,'. 173 might be considered a grant
of subpoena powers for adjudicatory purposes. In Smith v. State
Bd. of Accountancy,174 however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the accountancy board under the section in question
was authorized to conduct an investigation before making a charge,
and would thus probably sustain the use of these subpoena powers
for inquisitional purposes. This case illustrates how easy it is for
administrative bodies to use a grant of subpoena powers for in-
vestigative purposes.
16. State Sovereignty Commission
Mississippi and Arkansas each have established a State Sover-
eignty Commission with inquisitional subpoena powers.""0 Its
composition includes, in each case, the governor, the attorney
general, and members of the legislature. The stated purpose of
these agencies is to protect the state "and her sister states, from
encroachment thereon by the Federal Government.' 170 Each act
contains a compulsory testimony provision, and the Arkansas act
specifically indicates that the Commission may conduct its inqui-
sitional hearings either in "public or in executive session." 1"
board of registration in medicine) (Supp. 1961), § 14.629(19) (state board
of dentistry), § 14.579 (state board of osteopathic registration and exanina-
tion), § 14.597 (state board of chiropractic examiners) (1960).
The same is true of Mississippi and Missouri. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN.§ 8632-15(g) (state board of architecture), § 8738 (board of barber examiners),
§ 8910 (board of public accountancy), § 8915-14 (state board of cosmetol-
ogy) (1956); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 8.06 (board of law examiners); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 327.230(1) (state board of registration for architects and professional
engineers), § 329.160(1) (state board of cosmetology), § 330.175(1) (state
board of chiropody), §§ 332.160(8), .840(1) (Missouri dental board), § 335.10
(state board of nursing), § $39.080(2) (Missouri real estate commission) (1959),
§ 333.035(3) (state board of embalming) (Supp. 1961).
173. KY. REv. STAT. § 325.360(5) (1962).
174. 271 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1954).
175. ARK. STAT. ANN. §8 6-802, -813 (Supp. 1963); MISS. CODF ANN.
§8 9028-31, -38 (1956).
176. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-810(a) (Supp. 1963); MIss. CODE. ANN. § 9028-
35 (1956).
177. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-812 (Supp. 1963).
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Each act also contains an inspection provision. 78 The Missis-
sippi act permits the members of the commission and their em-
ployees to examine "all records, books, documents and other
papers touching upon or concerning the matters and things about
which the commission is authorized to conduct an investiga-
tion.' 79 Failure to comply with one of the commission's inspection
orders is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of from 100 to 1,000
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Smith v. Faubus, °80 a suit by
Negro ministers to have the act creating the commission and
another act requiring persons engaged in certain activities to
register with the Commission adjudged void, held that the Arkan-
sas inspection provision violated the state constitutional guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures.''
The Arkansas act, surprisingly enough, establishes a right to
counsel that extends beyond ear-whispering, allowing witnesses "to
be accompanied by counsel, of their own choosing, who shall have
the right to advise witnesses of their rights and to make brief
objections to the relevancy of questions and to procedure." -t
17. Un-American Activities Commission
Over 12 states have set up committees or commissions to in-
vestigate un-American activities. Of these bodies the most active
were the Tenney Committee in California, the Broyles Commis-
sion in Illinois, the Tusk (1919-1920) and Rapp-Coudert (1940-
1942) Committees in New York, the Ohio Un-American Activities
Commission, and the Canwell Committee in the state of Wash-
ington. 83 Some of the acts creating these bodies are still in force,
178. Aux. STAT. AwN. § 6-811 (Supp. 1963); Miss. CODE Ax,-. § 9028-42
(1956).
179. M ss. CODE A. .§ 9028-31 (1956).
180. 230 Ark. 831, 327 S.W.2d 562 (1959). Additionally, the court held
the provision in this act for the appointment to the Commission of members
of the legislature, as well as the registration act, to be void. But in Golding
v. Armstrong, 231 MAss. 889, 97 So. 2d 379 (1957), a suit that did not chal-
lenge the constitutionality of any part of the Mississippi act, the Mssissippi
Supreme Court held that a member of the legislature could serve as the
executive director of the Commission.
181. ARK. CoNsT. art. 2, § 15.
182. ARx. SmT. Aswx. § 6-812 (Supp. 1961).
183. The activities of various of these bodies are summarized or described
in BARRE , Tan Tamy Co isrr (1951); Barrett, California: Regulation
and Investigatim of Subversive Activities, Harsha, Illinois.: The Broyles
Commission, Chamberlain, New York" A General of Legislative Alarm,
Countryman, Washington." The Canwel Committee, and Gellhorn, A General
View, in THE STATES AND SuavmsoN (Gellhorn ed. 1952).
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but those bodies composed wholly of members of the legislature,
as in Ohio"s4 and South Carolina,"s5 are beyond the scope of this
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), reversing 183 F.2d 121 (9th
Cir. 1952), the Court held that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act against members of the California Senate Fact-
Finding [Tenney) Committee on Un-American Activities.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave an advisory opinion
that the Special Commission which the legislature created to investigate
communism could not punish for contempt, for its membership included
persons not elected to the legislature. Opinion of the Justices, 331 Mass.
764, 119 N.E.2d 885 (1954).
The New York courts sustained the subpoenas of both its Lusk and its
Rapp-Coudert Committees. In Matter of Joint Legislative [Rapp-Coudertl
Comm. to Investigate Educ. Sys. of New York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769
(1941), it sustained a subpoena duces tecum calling for the membership list
of the Teachers Union. In Matter of Martens, 109 Misc. 492, 180 N.Y. Supp.
171 (Sup. Ct. 1919), it upheld a subpoena duces tecum on Ludwig C. A. K.
Martens, who had been acting as the unofficial representative of the unrec-
ognized Soviet government.
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. James, 36 Wash. 2d 882, 221
P.2d 482 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951), affirmed contempt con-
victions of four faculty members of the University of Washington for failure
to answer questions about Communist party membership before the Wash-
ington Joint Legislative Fact-Finding [Canwell] Committee on Un-American
Activities.
184. OHIo REv. CODE. ANN. §§ 103.31-.38 (Page 1954). The Ohio Supreme
Court sustained a number of contempt convictions for refusal to answer
questions of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, some of which
in turn were affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. In Slagele v.
Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961), affirming in part, by an equally divided Court, and
reversing in part 170 Ohio St. 216, 163 N.E.2d 177 (1959), the Court affirmed
in part as to three individuals, while reversing as to two; in Raley v. Ohio.
360 U.S. 423 (1959), affirming in part, by an equally divided Court, and
reversing in part 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N.E.2d 847 (1958), it affirmed as to
one individual, while reversing as to three.
185. S.C. CoD §§ 30-141 to 30-145 (1962).
Florida in 1956, 1957, 1959 and 1961 set up a joint legislative committee
to investigate the activities in that state of organizations and individuals ad-
vocating violence or a course of conduct that would constitute a violation of
its laws. Fla. Laws 1956, ch. 31498, at 396; Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-125, at 203;
Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-207, at 835; Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-62, at 90. The last
three acts all recite that the committee's records disclose "that the Com-
munist party, its fronts and apparatus and other subversive organizations are
seeking to agitate and engender ill-will between the races of this and other
states." The 1956 committee began an investigation of the NAACP. The 1957
committee continued the inquiry and sought by subpoena to obtain the
entire membership list of the Miami branch of the NAACP. Production was
refused and the committee obtained a court order that the list be produced.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that the committee could not
require production and disclosure of the entire membership list of the organ-
ization, but that it could compel the custodian of the records to bring them
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study. The Hawaiian Commission on Subversive Activities,18
however, is representative of those commissions that are relevant
to this study; it may meet at any place in the state, in public or
executive session. s'8 Although this commission has the benefit of a
compulsory testimony provision, 88 the act does give witnesses the
right to be accompanied and advised by counsel, in addition to the
right to be informed of the subject of the investigation, to supple-
ment their testimony with matters covered in previous investiga-
tions, to inspect the record of their testimony, and to be unhamp-
ered by photographers and radio and television broadcasters while
they are testifying'8 9
18. Anti-Discrmimination Commission
Colorado has an Anti-Discrimination Commission, and New
York a State Commission for Human Rights, formerly named the
State Commission Against Discrimination. Both agencies have
investigative subpoena powers 9 ' and are empowered with com-
pulsory testimony provisions' 91
to the hearings and to refer to them to determine whether specific individuals,
otherwise identified or suspected of being Communists, were NAACP mem-
bers. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 108 So. 2d 729 (FIa.
1958), cert. denied, 860 U.S. 919 (1959).
The 1959 committee continued the investigation. The president of the
fiami branch of the NAACP was ordered to appear before the Committee
with the membership list; he appeared, but without -the list. A Florida court
adjudged him in contempt and sentenced him to six months imprisonment
and fined him $1,200, or, in default of payment, an additional six months
imprisonment. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, but the United States
Supreme Court reversed. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963), reversing 126 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1960).
In Graham v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 133
(Fla. 1960), the Florida court reversed a contempt conviction of one who
refused to tell the committee whether he was a member of the NAACP.
186. HAwAn REv. LAws § 361-1 (1955).
187. HAwAiI REv. LAWS § 361-4(f) (1955).
188. HAw. .I REv. LAWS § 861-11 (1955).
189. HAWAn REV. LAWS § 361-5 (1955).
190. CoLo. Lay. STAT. ANx. § 80-24-5 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. Exsc. LAw
§ 295.
191. CLo. Rav. STAT. Anx. § 80-24- (Supp. 1960). In Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 UTS. 714 (1903),
reversing 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962), the Court held that federal legislation
had not pre-empted the field. In Board of Higher Educ. v. Carter, 16 App.
Div. 2d 443, 228 N.Y.SM2d 704 (1st Dep't 1902), the New York court held
that the powers of the New York State Commission for Human Rights, with
respect to investigations, extended to the activities of the Board of Higher
Education in the City of New York, saying: "The provisions of the statute
should be construed and applied liberally to accomplish the purposes there-
of." Id. at 447,228 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
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19. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
In addition to the hundreds of state administrative agencies
with inquisitional subpoena powers, there is one bi-state agency
with such powers- the Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor. This body was established by the Waterfront Commission
Act adopted by New York and New Jersey in 1953."2 Part I of
the act, which embodies the interstate compact between New
York and New Jersey, was submitted to Congress for its consent,
pursuant to Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, and Congress
consented." 8 The purpose of the act was to improve waterfront
labor conditions in the port of New York district.
The Commission has broad inquisitional subpoena powers, sup-
plemented by a compulsory testimony provision.0 In adjudicatory
hearings, a 1954 amendment provides that "applicants, prospec-
tive licensees, licensees and registrants shall have the right to be
accompanied and represented by counsel."'15 Yet the act contains
no provision for counsel in investigative proceedings. Moreover,
the commission's regulations provide for counsel in adjudicative
proceedings,"" but not in inquisitional hearings;1' 7 in such hear-
ings, although the Commission permits witnesses to be accom-
panied by counsel, the role of such counsel is limited."8
Strenuous attacks were made on the constitutionality of the
section of the act relating to the collection of funds for unions and
upon the commission's powers, but they all failed. In De Veau v.
Braisted,"'0 the United States Supreme Court, affirming the New
York Court of Appeals, sustained the validity of the challenged
section against contentions that it conflicted with the supremacy
clause of Article VI, violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, and was an ex post facto law and bill of at-
tainder forbidden by Article I, section 10, of the Constitution.
192. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws § 9801-937 (McKinney 1961); N.J. REv.
STAT. §§ 82:23-I to 32:23-113 (1968).
193. Act of Aug. 12, 1953, ch. 407, 67 Stat. 541.
194. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 9906(5) (McKinney 1961); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 32:23-86(5) (1963).
195. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws § 9911(1) (McKinney 1961); NJ. REV. STAT.
§ 32:2s-91(1) (1963).
196. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Regs. §§ 6.7, 9.8 (June 9, 1958).
197. Id. § 1.14.
198. See State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 183, 175 A.2d 622, 628 (1061).
199. 363 U.S. 144 (1960), affirning 5 N.Y.2d 236, 157 N.E.2d 105, 183
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959); accord, Hazelton v. Murray, 21 NJ. 115, 121 A.2d
1 (1956) (Brennan, J.).
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Subsequently, in Cleary v. Bolger' 0 the Court, reversing the
Second Circuit, refused to enjoin one of the commission's detec-
tives from testifying, either at a commission proceeding or in a
state criminal trial, as to statements made by one defendant dur-
ing his illegal detention by federal officers.
The courts, New York, New Jersey and federal, in many cases
sustained the Commission's position in the enforcement of its
subpoenas as generously as the federal courts enforced the sub-
poenas of the Price Administrator of the OPA. In Bell v. Water-
front Comm'n,20 1 the Second Circuit refused to vacate two of the
Commission's subpoenas duces tecum on the president of two
locals of the International Longshoremen's Association for the
production of the basic financial records and minutes of these
locals. The court held that the Waterfront Commission Compact
did not conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, nor was
the Compact pre-empted by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
that the Commission could investigate a waterfront work
stoppage?02 The same court and the Supreme Court, New York
County, held that the Commission had jurisdiction to investigate
alleged misappropriation of trust funds held for the benefit of
longshoremen and other waterfront workers registered with or
licensed by the Commission 03 According to the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, the Commission's jurisdiction was "clear. ' - The
New York courts, in Gleason v. Waterfront Comm'nP°  held that
the Commission could require the production of the books and
records of a union welfare fund.
Various cases held that the Commission could subpoena union
members as well as union books and records. 0 0 In one of these,
200. 371 U.S. 392 (1963), 48 Mm.m. L. REv. 349, reverwing 293 F.2d 368
(2d Cir. 1961), affirming 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
201. 279 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960), afflirming 183 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
202. Matter of Waterfront Cornm'n, 35 NJ. 62, 171 A.2d 295, cert. denied
sub nor. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 368 U.S. 32 (1961).
203. In re Buoncuore, 39 NJ. 20, 186 A.2d 673 (1962); Matter of Lynch,
S7 Misc. 2d 442,234 N.YS.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
204. 39 NJ. at 22, 186 Ad at 674.
205. 14 Misc. 2d 900, 182 N.YS.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div.
2d 799, 188 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1959).
206. Applegate v. Waterfront Conm'n, 184 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Application of Waterfront Comm'n (In e Marchitto), 32 NJ. 323, 160 A.-d
832 (1960); Waterfront Comm'n v. Marchitto, 26 Mhsc. 2d 767, 206 N.YS.2d
123 (Sup. Ct. 1960), cert. denied, 368 US. 954 (1962); Barone v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 18 Misc. 2d 1066, 187 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Local 824 v.
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the New Jersey Supreme Court, in affirming a civil contempt
judgment, stressed the grand jury analogy, citing United States
Supreme Court cases.0 7 In another, the New Jersey superior court
held that there was "no merit" to the contention that it was viola-
tive of due process for the Commission to subpoena a New Jersey
resident to attend a hearing in New York.208 The Supreme Court,
New York County, has held that the Commission could subpoena
witnesses to testify in a public inquisitional hearing after these
witnesses had testified on several occasions before it in private
inquisitional hearings. This court also held, citing federal cases,
that a subpoenaed witness was not entitled to a transcript of his
testimony.20 9 Subpoenaed witnesses sought relief in the federal
and state courts; they lost both places.210 Officials of the Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association sought the help of the state
courts of New Jersey as well as New York; again they lost both
places.2 ' Yet these state courts granted the Commission's motions
to have the same witness held in contempt. 12
Waterfront Comm'n, 16 Misc. 2d 632, 182 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1958), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). In Connolly v. O'Malley, 17 App. Div. 2d 411,
234 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1st Dep't 1963), the court stated that the Waterfront
Commission Act "by virtue of its beneficient purposes, is to receive a most
liberal construction and application." Id. at 419, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
207. Application of Waterfront Comm'n (In re Marchitto), 32 N.J. 323,
339, 840, 160 A.2d 832, 841 (1960): "The same considerations dictating that
grand jury subpoenas need not reveal the subject matter under inquiry also
persuade us that an investigating agency need not forecast or limit by specifi-
cation the scope of its examination merely to gain jurisdiction of a person
whose testimony is relevant to a matter properly under investigation."
208. Application of Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. Super. 33, 43, 120 A.2d
504, 509 (Super. Ct. 1956). "[T]he form of the investigation is left to the
discretion of the agency." Applegate v. Waterfront Comm'n, 23 Misc. 2d 1090,
1091, 204 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
209. Waterfront Comm'n v. Barone, 20 Misc. 2d 327, 329, 192 N.Y.S.2d
829, 832 (Sup. Ct. 1959): "The privilege extended . . . as to representation
... by counsel does not carry with it the right, as in the case of an
adversary-party proceeding, to a copy of his testimony." But in State v.
Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 188, 175 A.2d 622, 631 (1961), the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that the Commission could not "by its own enactment relieve
itself of the obligation to make disclosure in a criminal proceeding or im-
munize itself from a judicial order to enforce that obligation."
210. See, e.g., Applegate v. Waterfront Comm'n, 184 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Applegate v. Waterfront Comm'n, 23 Misc. 2d 1090, 204 N.Y.S.2d 197
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
211. See, e.g., In re Buoncuore, 39 N.J. 20, 186 A.2d 673 (1962); Matter
of Lynch, 37 Misc. 2d 442, 234 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
212. Application of Waterfront Comm'n (In re Marchitto), 32 N.J. 323,
160 A.2d 832 (1960); Waterfront Comm'n v. Marchitto, 26 Misc. 2d 767, 206
N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962).
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20. Inspection Orders
Added to the multitude of state statutes for inquisitions by
officials, are the almost countless municipal provisions for official
inspections of -various kinds. There are provisions for the inspec-
tion of premises to locate fire hazards or determine the origin
of suspicious fires. There are also provisions for the inspection of
premises for health or safety reasons, and for the inspection of
books and records of businesses, nonprofit organizations, banks,
insurance companies, and utility companies.
Two ordinances allowing the issuance of inspection orders for
matters concerning the public health were sustained by the United
States Supreme Court in Franlc v. Maryland 13 and Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. PriceY?1 4 The Frank decision was by a five to four vote,
while Eaton divided the Court evenly, Mr. Justice Stewart not
sittingY 5
In the Frank case a Baltimore health inspector demanded to in-
spect the petitioner's basement area. The petitioner refused. The
next day the inspector came again, this time accompanied by two
policemen. He knocked on the door, but there was no response.
He then swore out a warrant for the petitioner's arrest under a
section of the Baltimore City Code that imposes a 20 dollar fine
for each refusal to permit the commissioner of health to enter a
premises when he has cause "to suspect that a nuisance exists."'em
The petitioner was arrested, tried, convicted, and fined. The Su-
preme Court sustained the ordinance and affirmed petitioner's
judgment of conviction. Mr. Justice Douglas, in the opening
paragraphs of a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Brennan concurred, criticized the
Court's dilution of "the right of privacy which every homeowner
had the right to believe was part of our American heritage."2 17
In the Eaton case the ordinance was even more drastic, and
the facts even more striking. This ordinance empowers a housing
inspector "to enter, examine, and survey at any reasonable
hour. . .,2'1 The penalty for refusal to give this official "free
access" is a fine of not less than 20 dollars nor more than 200 dol-
lars or imprisonment of not less than two days or more than 30
213. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
214. 364 U.S. 263 (1960), aflr-ning 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N .2d 523
(1958), affirndng 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 NXE.2d 776 (1957).
215. Mr. Justice Stewart's father was on the Ohio Supreme Court that
decided the Frank case.
216. Quoted by the Court, 359 U.S. at 361.
217. 359 U.S. at 874.
218. Quoted in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 265 n.2 (1900).
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days or both, and each day of failure constitutes a separate viola-
tion.
The facts in the Eaton case demonstrate how far we have
traveled the inquisitional road. They are summarized by Mr.
Justice Brennan in a statement in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas joined, and deserve at least a
partial recital here:
One day three men who were housing inspectors came to his [peti-
tioner's] door, and said they wanted to come into the house and go
through the house and inspect the inside of the house. They had no
credentials, only a sheet of yellow note papers, and Taylor [petitioner]
said to them, "You have nothing to show me you have got a right to
go through my house." The response was, "We don't have to have, ac-
cording to the law passed four years ago." Replied Taylor, "That don't
show me that you got anything in there that you want for inspection,
and, further, I don't have nothing in my house that has to be inspected."
The man said, "Well, you know, according to this ordinance, that we
got a right to go through your house and inspect your house." "No, I
don't think you have, unless you got a search warrant," answered
Taylor.
The men went away, but tried by telephone to get permission for
access to Taylor's house. They were not successful. Then two of
the three men returned:
One had some sort of credential with a photograph on it. Neither had a
warrant of any kind. One said the housing inspector wanted to inspect
Taylor's house. Taylor said, "What do you have in there that you want
to inspect? I have nothing in my house for inspection." He was told,
"We have a right to come into your house, go through your house, in-
spect the whole inside of your house." Taylor's reaction to this was:
"You have nothing wrote down on paper. You don't have a thing to
show me you are going to come in there to inspect anything, and as far
as that goes you aren't coming in unless you have a search warrant to
get in." The men never came back with a search warrant, but as they
left, one said, "If you ain't going to let us in, we are entitled to get in,
and if you don't let us in, we are entitled to get in, and if you don't let
us in, I am going to leave it up to the Prosecutor." Whereupon Taylor
said: "I don't care what you do. You aren't coming in."219
Taylor was subsequently committed to jail, not being able to make
bond of 1,000 dollars. One Eaton, a lawyer, filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the Common Pleas Court on Taylor's behalf.
This court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and discharged
Taylor from custody, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed. Its
judgment was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court, whose judg-
219. 864 U.S. at 265-66.
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ment, in turn, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.20
IX. STATE INQUISITIONAL TREND
In two respects the force of the state inquisitional trend is even
stronger than the federal one. For one thing, many states have
completely abandoned the use of the grand jury. For another,
there is a lack of provision for counsel for witnesses in investiga-
tive proceedings. Such provisions do occur, but they are the rare
exception rather than the rule. Of the 39 states that provide for
investigations into suspicious fires, only one, Georgia, provides
specifically for counsel. Even when counsel are permitted to
accompany witnesses in state inquisitional proceedings, the role
of such counsel is usually limited to ear-whispering.
In inquisitions by federal administrative officials, section 6(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act does provide some protec-
tion for constitutional rights, but there is nothing comparable on
a state level. There was a Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws at its annual meeting in 1946, after the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. There is also the
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, approved by
the National Conference at its annual meeting in its seventieth
year in the summer of 1961. But these documents make no provi-
sion for counsel for witnesses in investigative proceedings.
If one takes the state inquisitional trend, consisting of the
hundreds of state agencies with inquisitional subpoena powers,
the even greater number of provisions for the inspections of
premises and of books and records, and the abandonment by
many states of the grand jury, and adds to this trend such deci-
sions as Inz re Groban?-'z and Anonymous v. Baker2 - sanction-
ing secret inquisitional proceedings from which counsel for sub-
poenaed witnesses are excluded -Shapiro v. United States2-
with its required records exception to the fifth amendment's right
of silence - and the repeated decisions in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the validity of compulsory testimony acts,
220. When the Court noted probable jurisdiction in this case, the four
Iustices who voted against it, Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and
Whittaker, filed a separate memorandum in which they expressed their view
that the Ohio case was controlled by, and should be affirmed on the authority
of the Maryland case. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 240, 248 (1959).
221. 352 U.S. 30 (1957).
222. 860 U.S. 287 (1959).
223. 885 U.S. 1 (1948).
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one will see that we have arrived at the point, to use the living
words of James Otis in his argument against the legality of writs
of assistance,224 quoted by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion in In 'e Groban,220 where we have placed "the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer. 220
224. A writ of assistance was the chief weapon for the enforcement of
the revenue laws. It was a blanket permit issuable to anyone, authorizing
him to search any suspected place. The only limitation was that the search
had to be in the daytime. Otis was advocate general for the crown, and as
such it became his duty to argue for the validity of these writs; instead he
resigned his office and took the other side of the case. In a masterful address
he denounced writs of assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental prin-
ciples of law that ever was found in an English law-book." See 2 TRE WORKS
OF JOHN AnAms 523 (App.) (Chas. Francis Adams ed. 1850); TuDoR, LIFE oF
JAMs OTIs 63 (1823). The judges, almost convinced, sent to England for
advice; but subsequently, in obedience to orders from the ministry, they
recognized the writs. Although the case was lost, the cause was not. John
Adams, who heard Otis' argument, later wrote: "Every man of a crowded
audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms against
writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born." Letter to William Tudor, March 29, 1817, printed
in 8 BOSTON, DIRECTORS OF THE OLD SOUTH WORK, OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS 57,
60 (No. 179, p. 4).
225. 352 U.S. 330, 338 (1957).
226. See 2 TE WORKS OF JOHN ADAms 524 (app.) (Chas. Francis Adams
ed. 1850); TuloR, LIFE OF JAmEs OTIs 66 (1823). Counsel for the sub-
poenaed witnesses in In re Eastburn & Son, Inc., 51 Del. 446, 147 A.2d 921
(1959), drew attention to the objections in colonial times to writs of assist-
ance, but the court made light of his argument:
...Counsel, in his zeal for his clients, is led to the somewhat extrava-
gant statement that if this subpoena is sustained the Attorney General
is superior to the law, and has in effect been clothed with the power
to issue an obnoxious Writ of Assistance. The simple answer to all this
is that the Attorney General has no power himself to seize anything.
If his subpoena is not heeded he must apply to the court ....
Id. at 453, 147 A.2d at 925.
(Part III of this Article will be published in Volume 48.)
